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COMMON CARRIER LIABILITY IN THE ATOMIC AGE
THE CuMMINS AMENDMENT TO THE INTERSTATE CoMMERCE AcT
Anthony F. Arpaia* and Clarence G. Jensent

ANY

discussion of carriers' liability for goods transported by them
the famous case of Coggs v. Bernard.1
There Lord Holt two hundred and fifty years ago stated the obligation
of carriers to their patrons in language which has lost none of its force
and clarity by the lapse of time:
"The law charges this person thus intrusted to carry goods,
against all events, but acts of God, and of the enemies of the King.
For though the force be never so great, as if an irresistible multitude of people should rob him, nevertheless he is chargeable. And
this is a politick establishment, contrived by the policy of the law,
for the safety of all persons, the necessity of whose affairs oblige
them to trust these sorts of persons, that they may be safe in their
ways of dealing; for else these carriers might have an opportunity
of undoing all persons that had any dealings with them, by combining with thieves, &c., and yet doing it in such a clandestine
manner as would not be possible to be discovered. And this is the
reason the law is founded upon in that point."2

rl. necessarily begins with

The logic of the jurist's reasoning was inescapable, and common
carriers remained subject to this extremely burdensome rule for a long
time. The first modification, however slight, came when the courts
held the rule to be inapplicable where the shipper had practiced a
fraud on the carrier by misrepresenting the nature of the goods to be
transported. 3 Later, however, it was more substantially relaxed when
common carriers were permitted, by contracts with shippers, to exempt
themselves from their extraordinary carrier liability, i.e., their liability
over and above that for negligence. The usual consideration for such
an exemption was a reduced rate of carriage.4
,,_ Commissioner, Interstate Commerce Commission.-Ed.
the Bureau of Traffic, Interstate Commerce Commission.-Ed.
1 1 SMITH'S LI!ADING CASES, 8th ed., 369 (1885).
2 Id. at 379. The subject was one on which Lord Holt could perhaps speak with
peculiar authority. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, "he is said to have spent a
very dissolute youth, and even to have been in the habit of taking purses on the highway."
s See 6 CYc. ol' LAW AND PROCEDURE, Carriers, 401, note 5 (1903).
4 York Mfg. Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 107 (1865); New York
Cent. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 357 (1873), and the earlier English cases
there cited.
Rule 1 of the Uniform Freight Classification evidently was designed to give effect to
this limitation, although its precise origin is lost in the past. The Uniform Freight Classi-
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But while this modification soon found general recognition and
acceptance, the cases and text books remained agreed that a carrier
could go no further, and that any provisions in a shipping contract
purporting to limit the carrier's liability for negligence were contrary
to public policy and void. 5 The 6.rst authoritative decision by the
courts of this country which further encroached on Lord Holt's original
rule was Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad.6 The substance of the decision, which has become a leading case on the subject, was that "where
a contract of carriage, signed by the shipper, is fairly made with a railroad company, agreeing on a valuati~n of the property carried, with
the rate of freight based on the condition that the carrier assumes liability only to the extent of the agreed valuation, even in case of loss or
damage by the negligence of the carrier, the contract will be upheld." 7
The federal courts were necessarily bound by the decision; the state
courts remained free to go their own way. Some of them followed the
new federal rule, but many continued to hold that a common carrier
fication, it should be stated, is a basic schedule compiled jointly by all railroads subject to
regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and which governs the application of
their various rate schedules. The rule recites, .in archaic language, that the shipper may
either ship his goods at the rates in the carrier's tariff, with the carrier's liability limited so
far as the law permits, or if he prefers he may ship at rates ten per cent higher subject to
the assumption by the carrier of full common-law liability. Few shippers and rate experts
today appear to be aware of the existence of the rule, and £ewer still, if any, fully appreciate its purpose and significance. When highway carriers came under federal regulation
in 1935 they copied Rule 1 of the railroad classification into their National Motor Freight
Classification, and have kept it there since-with equally scant inquiry as to its legal meaning and effect. Shipments by either railway or highway are invariably tendered and transported at the published tariff rates; it would be quite unheard of for a shipper to ask for
transportation on any other basis. As a practical matter, therefore, when common carriers
accept goods for transportation in interstate commerce they are liable only for such loss or
damage as results from their negligence.
5 HUTCHINSON, CARRIERS, 2d ed., §250 (1891); New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v.
Boston Merchants' Bank, 6 How. (47 U.S.) 343 (1848); Express Co. v. Kountze Bros.,
8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 342 (1869).
6 112 U.S. 331, 5 S.Ct. 151 (1884).
7Id. at 331. The Court nevertheless further said (at 340-341), in what seems an
interesting bit of rationalizing: "The limitation as to value has no tendency to exempt from
liability for negligence. It does not induce want of care. It exacts from the carrier the
measure of care due to the value agreed on. The carrier is bound to respond in that value
for negligence. • •• The shipper is estopped from saying that the value is greater. • • • The
carrier must respond for negligence up to that value. It is just and reasonable that such a
contract, fairly entered into, and where there is no deceit practiced on the shipper, should
be upheld. There is no violation of public policy. On the contrary, it would be unjust and
unreasonable, and would be repugnant to the soundest principles of fair dealing and of the
freedom of contracting, and thus in conflict with public policy, if a shipper should be
allowed to reap the benefit of the contract if there is no loss, and to repudiate it in case of
loss."
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could not by any means or device avoid the full consequences of its own
negligence. 8

The Carmack Amendment
Congress did nothing to set the question at rest until 1906 when
it enacted the Carmack amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act. 9
The amendment stated that any common carrier receiving property for
transportation "shall be liable [to the owner] for any loss, damage or
injury to such property caused by it or by any [of its connections], and
no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation shall exempt such common
carrier ... from the liability hereby imposed." The amendment plainly
was not intended to set aside a carrier's common-law right to divest
itself of its extraordinary carrier liability; damage "caused by it'' could
only mean damage resulting from the carrier's negligence or wrongdoing.10
When the Supreme Court came to construe the amendment in
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger,11 it proved itself to be quite resourceful. It said:
"That the legislation supersedes all the regulations and policies
of a particular State upon the same subject results from its general
character.... Almost every detail of the subject is covered so completely that there can be no rational doubt but that Congress intended to take possession of the subject and supersede all state
regulation with reference to it....
"We come now to the question of the validity of the provision
in the receipt or bill of lading limiting liability to the agreed value
of fifty dollars.... That no inquiry was made as to the actual value
is not vital to the fairness of the agreement in this case. The receipt
which was accepted showed that the charge made was based upon
s Solan v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 95 Iowa 260, 63 N.W. 692 (1895); Baughman v. Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co., 94 Ky. 150, 21 S.W. 757 (1893); Gardner v.
Southern Ry. Co., 127 N.C. 293, 37 S.E. 328 (1900); Chicago, R. I. & P.R. Co. v. Witty,
32 Neb. 275, 49 N.W. 183 (1891); Duntley v. B. & M. R.R., 66 N.H. 263, 20 A. 327
(1890); B. & 0. R. Co. v. Hubbard, 72 Ohio St. 302, 74 N.E. 214 (1905); Normile v.
Oregon Navigation Co., 41 Ore. 177, 69 P. 928 (1902); Southern Ex. Co. v. Owens, 146
Ala. 412, 41 S. 752 (1906).
9 34 Stat. L. 595 (1906), now incorporated in ,in, §20 of the statute, 49 U.S.C.
(1946) §20(11).
10 Another and perhaps the principal motivation for this amendment was to prevent a
shipper from being compelled to £nd the carrier responsible for the loss of his goods, and to
reach him in a distant jurisdiction. The amendment apparently was not made the subject
of committee hearings and report by either branch of Congress, but was included in a
general revision of the Interstate Commerce Act which was made in 1906, the revision
being often referred to as the Hepburn Act.
11226 U.S. 491, 33 S.Ct. 148 (1913).
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a valuation of :6.fty dollars unless a greater value should be stated
therein. The knowledge of the shipper that the rate was based
upon the value is to be presumed from the terms of the bill of
lading and of the published schedules :6.led with the Commission....
"That a common carrier cannot exempt himself from liability ,
for his own negligence or that of his servants is elementary.... The
rule of the common law did not limit his liability to loss and damage due to his own negligence, or that of his servants. That rule
went beyond this and he was liable for any loss or damage which
resulted from human agency, or any cause not the act of God or
the public enemy. But the rigor of this liability might be modi:6.ed
through any fair, reasonable and just agreement with the shipper
which did not include exemption against the negligence of the
carrier or his servants....
"It has therefore become an established rule of the common
law as declared by this court in many cases that such a carrier may
by a fair, open, just and reasonable agreement limit the amount
recoverable by a shipper in case of loss or damage to an agreed
value made for the purpose of obtaining the lower of two or more
rates of charges proportioned to the amount of the risk. . . .
"We therefore reach the conclusion that the provision of the
act forbidding exemptions from liability imposed by the act is not
violated by the contract here in question."12
So the effect of the Carmack amendment, after the court had :finished with it, was to set aside the common-law rule against limitations
of liability for negligence in those states where the rule was still being
followed, and to establish the rule of Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad
everywhere--a result certainly difficult to reconcile with the language
of the enactment.
The Interstate Commerce Commission had regarded the matter
differently. In a closely-reasoned analysis of the Carmack amendment
a few years earlier1 3 it had concluded that there was no inconsistency
between the Hart case and the common-law rule voiding stipulations
against the carrier's liability for negligence unless induced by the shipper's fraud. The Commission said:
"That [Hart] decision was expressly predicated upon the principle of estoppel; the shipper had misrepresented the value of his
property, and had thereby secured the bene:6.t of a lower rate than
12 Id. at 505-512.
13 Jn the Matter of

Released Rates, 13 I.C.C. 550 (1908).
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he was properly entitled to by virtue of the real value. He was
estopped by his fraudulent conduct from recovering an amount in
excess of the value he had declared. In the case we are now considering, the requisites of estoppel are wanting. An estoppel can
not arise unless the party invoking it has been the victim of misrepresentation and has himself acted in good faith. Can it possibly
be argued that when a carrier has arbitrarily placed in its bill of
lading a stipulation limiting the amount of its liability, regardless
of the actual value of the property, it may claim the benefit of an
estoppel? Obviously not. ...
"If the shipper and carrier collusively agree that, for the purpose of the transportation, the property shall be deemed to have a
specified value which both know to be grossly disproportionate to
the true value, the agreement can not be called bona fide. It may
be styled an 'agreed valuation,' but it is obviously an attempt to
accomplish what the law forbids. The requirement that the carrier
shall not limit in any degree its responsibility for negligence is
uncompromising....
"Careful study of the opinion [in the Hart case] ... must lead
inevitably to the conclusion that the principle does not extend
beyond the case where the 'agreed valuation' is bona fide .... To
hold otherwise would mean a departure from principles which the
Supreme Court has maintained with unvarying consistency."14
By its decision in Pierce v. Wells Fargo & Co.,15 the Supreme Court
put the quietus on these interesting speculations. The suit was for the
recovery of the value of a carload of automobiles ($15,000) which had
been destroyed by .fire. Negligence on the part of the carrier was conceded. The bill of lading under which the shipment had been made
contained a printed stipulation that the carrier's liability would be limited to $50 unless the shipper declared a higher value and paid an
excess-valuation charge. The Court sustained the $50 limitation,
saying: 16
"The case as made therefore presents the question whether one
who has deliberately and purposely, without imposition or fraud,
accepted a contract of shipment limiting the amount of recovery
to $50 ... [and] who is given the privilege of paying an increased
rate and having the liability for the full value of the goods, is entitled in case of loss to recover the full value of the property....
14 Id. at 554-557.
111236 U.S. 278, 35 S.Ct. 351 (1915).
16 Id. at 283-285.
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"In ... [the Hart case a similar contract] was sustained upon
the principle that the contract did not relieve against the carrier's
negligence, but limited the amount that might be recovered for
such negligence, and it was there held that such contracts when
fairly made did not contravene public policy. That case has been
frequently followed since and its doctrine applied in construing
limited liability contracts in connection with the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act....
"But it is said, and this was the basis for the dissenting opinion
in [the court below1 7 ], that there was no valuation at all in this
case, and that the disproportion between the actual value of the
automobiles shipped,-about $15,000,-and $50 demonstrates this
fact, and it is insisted that what was done was merely an arbitrary
and unreasonable limitation in the guise of valuation. This argument overlooks the fact that the legality of the contract does not ·
depend upon a valuation which shall have a relation to the actual
worth of the property."

The Cummins Amendment
Gradually after the decision in the Hart case and more rapidly after
the decision in the Croninger case, the railroads commenced to :611 their
tariffs with stipulations limiting their liability for negligence to "agreed"
values. These stipulations were particularly vexatious to livestock shippers in the West. The tariffs generally provided that in the event of loss
the carrier's liability would be limited to an amount which was only a
fraction of the actual value of the animals, unless the shipper declared
a higher value and subjected himself to the payment of a higher rate.
The higher rate was often-nearly always, in fact-not only unreasonably high but prohibitively high.
The zeal with which the railroads pressed the advantage thus given
them by the Supreme Court's construction of the Carmack amendment
caused great pressure to be brought upon Congress to legislate further
in this respect. In 1915 Congress responded by enacting the so-called
first Cummins Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act. The
amendment was faultily worded and was superseded a year later by
the second Cummins Amendment, which is ·now a part of section
20(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act. 18 The second amendment
was essentially a restatement of the Carmack amendment with uncle17 (2d Cir. 1911) 189 F. 561. The dissenting opinion in tum leaned heavily on the
Commission's decision in In the Matter of Released Rates, 13 I.C.C. 550 (1908).
1s 49 Stat. L. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. (1946) §20(11).
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niable clarity and emphasis. Congress in broad language stated that
any common carrier receiving property for transportation "shall be
liable" for any damage "caused by it" or by any connecting carrier; that
"no contract, receipt, rule, regulation, or other limitation of any character whatsoever shall exempt such common carrier from the liability
hereby imposed"; that in the event of loss or damage to the property in
transit "caused by" the initial carrier or any connecting carrier, the
carrier "shall be liable" to the owner "for the full actual loss, damage,
or injury ... notwithstanding any limitation of liability or limitation of
the amount of recovery or representation or agreement as to value in
any such receipt or bill of lading, or in any contract, rule, regulation, or
in any tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission; and any
such limitation, without respect to the manner or form in which it is
sought to be made is declared to be unlawful and void."
The amendment, however, then softened the impact by further
stating that, except with respect to ordinary livestock, the Interstate
Commerce Commission was empowered to authorize or require the
railroads to establish rates based upon and varying with the value of the
property, as declared or agreed to in writing by the shipper; and that
where the Commission had authorized or ordered the maintenance of
such varying rates the carrier's liability would be limited to the amount
so declared or agreed upon, even though that amount was known by
both shipper and carrier to be less than the true value. Rates on ordinary
livestock based on declared or agreed values were absolutely prohibited.
Understandably, the railroads opposed the legislation. They
admitted that the difference between their released and unreleased rates
was usually out of all proportion to the difference in risk, but they
insisted that the legislation was unnecessary, because, they said, ''The
shipper has a remedy; he can go to the Commission and have the Commission prescribe, both for past and future shipments, an unreleased
rate in reasonable relation to the released rate." The shippers retorted
that the suggested remedy was cumbersome, to use no stronger term;
and Congress indicated its acquiescence in that point of view by enacting the bill into law.
It is interesting to note also that in the course of the committee
hearings a representative of the express companies appeared and asked
that those carriers be exempted from the amendment. He stated that
the express companies, by their standard bill-of-lading forms, limited
their liability to $50 per shipment, or 50 cents per pound in the case
of shipments weighing more than 100 pounds, unless the shipper declared a higher value, in which event there was an added charge of IO
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cents for each $100 of excess value. Patrons of the express companies,
so he asserted, seemed to be satisfied with that arrangement, and he
hoped that Congress would not disturb it. The committee's answer in
reporting out the bill was in substance this: 'We will not exempt you,
but if your present practice is fair and reasonable, as it seems to be, you
can go to the Commission and obtain permission to continue as you
are now doing."19
Fifty dollars was often only a small fraction of the value of an
express shipment, even in 1915, but 10 cents per $100 was not an
exorbitant price to pay for insurance, and the spokesman for the express
companies was quite probably right in saying that the public did not
object to it.
It is therefore clear from this legislative history, as from the terms of
the amendment itself, that Congress was not seeking to restore the
common-law rule under which a carrier was forbidden to limit its liability for negligence, but rather to control the method by which the
limitation was effected. Many, of the then-effective tariff provisions
relating to the matter were unconscionable and shocking. The enactment voided all of them, and provided that none could be re-established
without the prior sanction of the Commission. And, plainly, the principal duty which the Congress intended to impose upon the Commission by the amendment was to see that wherever a released rate was
established-the only form of limited-liability rate permitted by the
amendment-there was also available to the shipper a properly related
unreleased rate, so as to give him always a fair and free choice between
leaving the risk of loss on the carrier or assuming it himself.
Early Administration of the Cummins Amendment

The first decision of the Commission dealing with the new statute
fell far short of meeting these expectations. It was rendered on an application by the express companies for blanket authority to continue all
rates based on released value as they were prior to the change in the law.
The decision, reported as Express Rates and Practices, 20 did not even
include a statement of the extent to which the express companies wished
to limit their liability or of what added charge they proposed to make
for the assumption of full liability. It consisted merely of four pages of
19 Transcript of Senate subcommittee hearings on S. 4522, Sixty-third Congress, second
session, and on S. 3069, Sixty-fourth Congress, first session; also Senate Committee report
on S. 3069, Sixty-fourth Congress, first session.
2043 I.C.C. 511 (1917).
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inconclusive speculation as to the meaning of the Cummins amendment, followed with a statement that:
"An order will be entered authorizing the maintenance of
existing express rates dependent upon the declared or released
value of the property transported, except ordinary live stock. . . .
[As to live stock the order will apply only to that chiefly valuable
for breeding, racing, show purposes or other special uses]." 21
Actually the proposals of the express companies were rather moderate.
On ordinary merchandise they sought to limit their liability to $50 per
shipment, or 50 cents per pound on shipments weighing more than 100
pounds, and to charge 10 cents for each $ 100 of excess declared value.
On fancy livestock they proposed to restrict liability to certain specified
values per head, which were a fair average of the then-prevailing prices
for ordinary stock of the same species; and to charge for excess value a
premium ranging from 1 to l¼ per cent of such value (not of the rate),
according to the length of the haul.
The liability provisions thus authorized in 1917 are still in effect
in the express tariffs today, except that since World War II the excessvalue charge on ordinary merchandise has been increased from 10 cents
to 15 cents per $100, and that for fancy livestock has risen, for short
hauls, from 1 to 1¼percent of the excess value, and for long hauls from
l¼ to 3¼ per cent.22
The second case before the Commission on the Cummins amendment was on an application from the railroads for authority to maintain
released freight rates on fancy livestock. The application was approved
in a decision reported as Live Stock Classi-fication. 23 The Commission
authorized basic values for the various kinds of livestock-$ 150 for a
horse, $50 for a cow, $15 for a hog, and so on-together with an increase in freight charges of 2 per cent for each 50 per cent or fraction
thereof of excess value. The Commission expressly found that this
increment in the rate was more than sufficient to compensate the rail2 lld.

at 514.
Perhaps the higher cost of investigating claims necessitated an increase in these
insurance premiums; it is not evident how or why inflation would otherwise affect them.
What probably occurred, however, was that the express company asked authority to increase
all of its rates and charges in order to meet higher operating costs, and the Commission, in
the absence of objection from shippers, allowed these insurance rates to be increased along
with all other rates. Judged by transit-insurance rates generally, they should be quite
profitable to the express company. On the other hand, if the absence of protests to the
Commission is a criterion, they are satisfactory to patrons of the express company. The
occasional express shipper does not object to paying a few cents extra for insurance, and the
shipper who makes shipments regularly and in volume buys his own insurance.
2347 I.C.C. 335 (1917).
22
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roads for the additional risk. Nevertheless it was not so great as to
deprive the shipper of a real choice of rates and of liability. Certainly
it was better than the condition often existing prior to the enactment
of the Cummins amendment when the shipper, if he failed to release
his hogs to a nominal price of $5 each, was subject to a rate increase of
I 00 per cent or more. The valuations and the basis of excess-value
charges which the Commission £xed thirty-£ve years ago are in effect
today unchanged, although both freight rates and livestock prices are
now several times higher than they were then.
After these two formal decisions the Commission began to dispose
of applications for permission to maintain released rates informally.
Applications were filed by the hundreds, permission being sought in
practically every case to continue released rates which had been invalidated by the Cummins amendment. And the Commission appears to
have granted all of these applications pro forma. No inquiry was made
as to whether the commodity was inherently of a nature for which released rates were appropriate, nor, more important, was any attempt
made to £x or control the spread between the released and the open or
full-liability rates. There was no objection from the shipping public
to the granting of these applications. The commodities on which released rates were thus authorized were household goods, soap, candy,
ore, chinaware, rugs, blackstrap molasses, and many others.
In 1923 the southern railroads filed an application for authority to
establish released rates on dressed marble and granite. Shippers objected to the granting of the application, as a result of which the Commission assigned it for a formal hearing. In its decision denying the
application, Released Rates on Stone, 24 the Commission for the first
time, eight years after the amendment was adopted, laid down certain
definite principles for administering it. It said:
"The fact that claims for loss and damage are frequent in
the transportation of a given commodity is not in itself a valid
reason for the establishment of released rates. If the commodity is
fairly uniform in value, so that the carrier knows with a reasonable
degree of certainty the liability it assumes when it accepts a shipment for transportation, it may and should establish reasonable
tariff regulations relative to packing and loading, with a view
to minimizing such claims, and, having done so, should then publish a single rate based on the known transportation characteristics
of the commodity. Nor is the fact that an article has a wide range
of value alone sufficient to warrant the establishment of released
24

93 I.C.C. 91 (1924).
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rates, because claims for loss and damage on that article may be
negligible in any event. But where those conditions concur, where
the susceptibility to loss or damage is comparatively high and the
wide range in the value of the commodity makes the amount of
any claim that may arise difficult to estimate, the carrier is at a disadvantage unless it is permitted to base its liability and its charges
on a declaration of value obtained in advance from the shipper. In
such a case a basic rate should be established conditioned upon the
declaration by the shipper of a fair average value of the commoner
forms of the commodity, together with one or more higher rates
to apply when a greater value is declared, such higher rates to be
no more than reasonably commensurate with the additional risk
assumed by the carrier.
"The value of the commodity transported is an element in
rate making aside from the risk of loss or damage, because it serves
to measure the value of the service rendered the shipper. But
where rates based on declared or agreed value have been authorized
by us, the statute accords shippers the right to-understate the value
for the purpose of securing the lower rate, and it is clear that if the
excess of the unreleased over the released rates is more than the
cost of insurance, shippers will ordinarily release the carrier and
obtain transit insurance elsewhere. But frequently transit insurance can not be obtained. When it is not available, those shippers
who are financially able to do so will assume the risk of loss themselves. The small shipper is less apt to be able to risk the loss of
his less frequent shipments, and will thus in greater measure feel
compelled to resort to the higher unreleased rates for adequate
protection. The alternative rates which would result from the
carriers' proposals will thus not work with equal justice to all. . . .
"The proposal of the carriers is to condition the application of
their commodity rates on dressed, polished or carved granite and
marble upon an agreement by the shipper to accept from 40 cents
to $I per cubic foot in satisfaction of claims for loss or damage.
These figures represent from 3 to 23 per cent of the average value.
In the event the shipper does not wish thus to relieve the carrier ·
from liability he will be given the alternative of paying the class
rates. These class rates, according to an exhibit introduced, are
from 18 to 240 per cent higher, although the difference between
full liability and total exemption from liability for claims, if translated into a difference in the rate, would very probably be less
than 5 per cent. We can not approve this proposal."25
25 Id.

at 93-94.
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Thereafter in considering applications by the railroads for permission to establish released rates an effort was made to dispose of them
with at least some reference to the principles stated in the Stone case.
If no sufficient reason appeared for subjecting the commodity to released rates-that is, if there was no great variation in its value and
little susceptibility to loss or damage-the application was denied. All
orders previously entered were also reviewed in the years immediately ·
following the decision in the Stone case, and many of them were revoked. For example, during the period between 1924 and 1934 all
released rates on soap, candy and blackstrap molasses were canceled.
If, however, the commodity was determined to be a proper one·
for the maintenance of released rates the practice was to grant the
application without attempting to limit the spread between the released
and the unreleased rates-despite all that had been said on the subject
in the Stone case.
Doubtless the piecemeal manner in which applications were considered and disposed of made adherence to basic principles of administration difficult. Nevertheless it would seem that the Commission
might well have issued some form of ·general order or announcement
to the effect that in granting any released-rate application it would
require the applicants to maintain full-liability rates not more than a
specified amount higher than the released rates (perhaps a percentage
of the excess value or a percentage of the rate, or a combination of both),
unless the applicants specially justified a wider rate spread for the article
under consideration.
But nothing of this nature was done. As illustrating the extremely
wide rate spreads which were sometimes permitted, mention may be
made of a request filed by the railroads in 1941 for permission to
establish released rates on certain articles when shipped in mixed
carloads with other articles, the other articles not being subject to
released valuation. They proposed to stipulate in their tariff that if
the shipper neglected to execute the release the article subject to
released value would be charged the less-than-carload rate. This meant
roughly a rate increase of 400 per cent for failure to release. The
Commission in granting the application limited the increase in the
rate for failure to release to a maximum of 25 per cent-which certainly was sufficient to compensate the railroads for the added risk
many times over. The railroads, however, were not satisfied. They
importuned the Commission to remove the 25 per cent limitation, and
ultimately the Commission granted the application unconditionally. 26
26

Released Rates Order No. 1064 of August 11, 1941, as amended March 16, 1943.
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Recent Administration of the Cummins Amendment
During the past ten years the Commission has continued to administer the Cummins amendment in much the manner just described.
The Stone case has been the guide in determining whether applications
should be denied or granted, but where applications have been granted
the carriers have been given virtually a free hand in fixing the spread
between the released and unreleased rates.
It may be interpolated here that although the railroads since the
war have increased their freight rates, including released-value rates,
an average of between 70 and 80 per cent, the basic valuations to which
the released rates are applied have not been commensurately increased,
and for the most part have not been changed at all. For example, continuously for the past thirty-five years or longer shippers of household
goods have been required to release to IO cents per pound, and shippers
of chinaware to $20 per 100 pounds, in order to obtain the lowest rates.
If, consistently with the dictum in the Stone case, those valuations
represented "a fair average value of the commoner forms" of the commodities in 1917 they manifestly are unreasonably low today.
Since the last war there have been two formal decisions of the
Commission relating to released rates, both having to do with highway
carriers. Highway carriers were made subject to the Cummins amendment in 1935 by section 219 of the Interstate Commerce Act. 27 The
first of these decisions was Released Rates on Engines. 28 The carriers
were concerned with the liability they were required to assume in
transporting certain kinds of gasoline engines, particularly those used
in airplanes, and asked authority to make them subject to released
rates in the National Motor Freight Classification. It was testified
at the hearing that while there had been no serious losses, the value
of the engines sometimes ran as high as $117,000 per truckload. The
Commission, after quoting at length from its decision in the Stone
case, made the obvious comment: "That proceeding embraced the
applications of rail carriers, whose financial ability to pay loss or damage
claims is relatively much greater than that of motor carriers." It concluded that released rates were proper, but that the lowest rates should
be made available on engines released to a valuation of $2.50 per pound
instead of 75 cents per pound as proposed by the carriers. The carriers
were invited to file a new application on that basis. Nothing whatever
was said in the decision as to how much shippers should reasonably
27 49

Stat. L. 563 (1935), as amended 49 U.S.C. (1946) §319.
(1948).

2s 47 M.C.C. 767
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be required to pay the carrier for insurance in those cases where they
were unwilling to release the engines to $2.50 per pound-and therein
the decision seems clearly to have been faulty. Responsive to the decision the carriers filed an application for authority to establish two
sets of rates, one to apply on shipments of engines released to $2.50
per pound, and the other, approximately 80 per cent higher, to apply
on shipments not so released. The _application was granted, informally,
and rates on those bases are in effect today. The 80 per cent rate
spread is grossly disproportionate to the added risk, measured by insurance costs, and hence operates virtually to deny the shipper the choice
of rates and of liability which the law plainly intended he should have
in every case.
The second formal decision since the war was Dry Goods Dependent on Value. 29 There certain highway carriers operating along the
Atlantic seaboard asked permission to establish rates on dry goods based
on a released value of $1 per pound, with rates 50 per cent higher on
shipments not released. The testimony showed that the actual values
rapged from 25 cents to $25 per pound. At $25 per pound a 20,000pound truckload of dry goods would be worth half a million dollars.
The Commission again cited the Stone case, and concluded that "released rates on the commodities under consideration are not just and
reasonable." This conclusion appears irreconcilable with that reached
three years previously in the Engine case.
Another interesting decision of the Commission which bears on this
subject is Rates on Articles of Exceptional Value. 30 In that case a
single large carrier proposed to state in its general rate tariff, in substance, that:
The rates in this tariff include insurance protection, except that
shipments of average value in excess of $2.50 per pound will not
be accepted unless notice of value of shipment is received by the
carrier prior to movement of the shipment. When such shipments
are accepted for transportation an additional charge of 5 cents per
$ I 00 will be made for insurance.
The Commission ordered the proposed rule suspended pending a
formal investigation to determine whether or not it was lawful. At
the hearing which followed tHe carrier showed that since the beginning
of the war it had transported, among other things, a 15-pound shipment
worth $850 ($56 per pound), a 21,000-pound shipment worth
20

53 M.C.C. 157 (1951).

so 44 M.C.C. 225 (1944).
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$208,000 ($10 per pound), a 7,000-pound shipment worth $286,000
($40 per pound), and an 8,000-pound shipment worth $337,000 ($40
per pound). On the three heavier shipments, being apprised in
advance of their value, the carrier had taken out additional insurance.
The cost of the insurance consumed the greater part of the freight
charges, so that the carrier performed the transportation for practically
nothing.
Plainly the proposed tariff rule was badly drafted. It disclaimed
liability in excess of $2.50 per pound unless a higher value was declared, but the disclaimer was by implication only. The carrier would
have been on firmer ground if it had filed an application under the
Cummins amendment for permission to state in its tariff that its liability
on any and all goods received for transportation would be limited to
$2.50 per pound unless the shipper declared a higher value and paid
a specified insurance premium. The Commission said:
"Although . . . we are constrained to find that the rule under
consideration is unlawful, we are not unmindful of the problem
confronting the respondent and other motor common carriers similarly situated in the transportation of shipments of high value....
Under the terms of section 20(11) of the act, the Commission may
grant authority to establish rates dependent upon and varying with
declared or agreed values, in cases where it is of the opinion that
such rates would be just and reasonable. . . . Respondent is free
to seek such authority. Rates based upon declared or agreed values
would provide a method for limiting respondent's liability.
"The parties argue that the commodities under consideration
are so numerous and varied as to make the establishment of released
ratings or rates impracticable. The commodities of high value that
respondent has been transporting, however, appear to be embraced
in a few well-recognized classification descriptions."31
The Commission then went on to speculate that the carrier might also
protect itself by increasing "its present general cargo insurance policy
to maximum limits of $250,000 per trailerload or $500,000 for an
aggregate loss involving two or more trailers in any one accident,"
and that "the additional cost would be met through an increase in
rates on articles of high value."
The carrier was right in asserting, and the Commission mistaken
in denying, that high-valued articles transported by common carriers
are of many different kinds and classes. But the carrier was mistaken
31 Id.

at 234.
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in concluding that this made the establishment of released rates impracticable. Rather that fact indicated the need for establishing released rates on all traffic without distinction, such as the express companies have always maintained. Nor was the Commission on firm
ground in suggesting that the carrier might purchase additional general
cargo insurance and pay for it by higher rates on valuable freight.
Except under a system of released rates, with excess-value charges
assessed on all valuable freight shipped under full carrier liability, the
cost of insurance would be merely a general operating expense and
would inevitably be reflected in the carrier's entire rate structure.
In the same decision the Commission observed, without comment,
that the carrier's operating certificate32 did not authorize it to transport "articles of extraordinary value." Nearly all motor-carrier certificates issued by the Commission contain such a restriction, although the
Commission has never undertaken to define the term. Additionally,
the tariffs of nearly all motor carriers, and of all railroads without
exception, contain a rule that articles of "extraordinary value" will not
be transported. Yet the rule is virtually never invoked by either highway or rail carriers. Trucking companies have been known to refuse
to transport freight which they knew to be of exceptional value on the
ostensible ground that their trucks were "too busy"-for which they
cannot be much censured. But a railroad will always accept any freight,
no matter how valuable, unless it happens to be one of the few commodities, such as jewelry or sterling•silverware, which it expressly states
in its tariffs that it will not transport.
The conclusion which the Commission reached in the Stone case,
that the assumption of a merely potential risk by a carrier in transporting freight was not a justification for limiting its liability, and that
released rates were proper only for goods which combine a wide range
in value with unusual susceptibility to loss or damage, was probably
sound under the conditions of 1924. Virtually all commercial transportation was then by railroad; highway transportation was in its infancy.
Had it been otherwise, and had the Commission been dealing with
highway-carrier rates it is reasonable to assume that it would not so
flatly have rejected potential risk as a justification for released rates;
for it is obvious without discussion that in transporting freight even
82 Operating certificates are issued to common carriers by highway under §§206 and
207 of the Interstate Commerce Act [49 Stat. L. 551 and 552 (1935), as amended 49
U.S.C. (1946) §§306, 307]. They define the routes and termini over and between which
the carrier may operate, and the kind or classes of goods which it may transport.
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a small railroad can assume with equanimity a financial risk which
to the average highway carrier would be insupportable.33
Again, an examination of the decisions indicates that in l 924 the
most expensive article for which the Commission had ever fixed freight
rates was calculating machines, worth $1.28 per pound.34 Today no
one is astonished to hear of goods moving by freight worth ten, twenty
or even fifty dollars per pound. And this striking change is by no means
solely due to inflation, although inflation of course has been a contributing factor. It is due chiefly to technological advances-if they are
advances. If adding machines, for instance, were worth $1.28 per
pound in 1924, the desk machine in rather common use today is probably worth $5 per pound or more. The price per machine perhaps has
not advanced much-it may even have declined somewhat-but the
machines now weigh only a fraction of what they did thirty years ago.
The two following items from a recent issue of Time are of interest
in this connection:
"In Manhattan, Curta Calculator Co. demonstrated a pocketsize calculator ... which looks like a small, black pepper mill, and
grinds out answers in much the same way. It can perform some
standard calculating operations faster than many electric machines,
and unlike most will calculate square roots almost instantaneously.
Price: $131.75.
"A portable wire recorder, weighing slightly more than 2 lbs.
and no bigger than a shaving kit, was put on the market by . . .
Monske & Co. for businessmen or reporters who want to dictate
while on the move. The Minifon is equipped with a small microphone, two dry-cell batteries, enough wire spools for 2½ hours of
recording. Price: $162."35
Likewise during the past ten or fifteen years the range of value
of articles in a given class or group has widened amazingly. In drugs
and medicines, for instance, the old-fashioned Epsom salts are still
available at about a dime a pound, but some of the new anti-biotics are
almost literally worth their weight in gold. In textiles and dry goods
mention has been made of the range which the Commission found,
from 25 cents to $25 per pound. In internal-combustion engines the
33 Continuously since 1936 the Interstate Commerce Commission has required motor
carriers to carry cargo insurance of only $1,000 per vehicle and $2,000 for each location
(freight stations and the like), although the great majority of carriers, as a matter of selfinterest, carry much more.
34 Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 91 I.C.C. 378 (1924).
S5TIME, Nov. 24, 1952, p. 107.
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range is from the one-cylinder pumping engine worth perhaps $75 to
the radial-type airplane engine weighing not much more but costing
in excess of $20,000. And so it is also of numerous other groups of
articles which are usually associated in freight tariffs and accorded a
common rate. It would not be feasible, generally speaking, to subdivide
these groups -by some refinement of language and description, and
subject the more expensive forms of a given class of articles to higher
rates. There is, if anything, too much refinement in the classification
of freight now.
In short, no solution of the problem which would be both workable
and fair suggests itself other than the establishment of released-value
rates for all freight. Even if it were possible and practicable-which
it is not-to subject to released rates only those groups of commodities
which include articles of exceptional value, another difficulty would be
certain to arise. The law expressly states that released rates may be
based only upon "the value declared in writing by the shipper or agreed
upon in writing as the released value." The standard bill-of-lading
form used by both the trucks and the railroads has a space in which the
"value" of the goods must be inserted when released rates are applicable.
The carriers have found, however, and particularly the highway carriers,
that their shippers very frequently neglect this detail in making out
their bills of lading. And the omission is quite understandable; when
an industry is making many shipments some of which are subject to
released rates and others are not it is very easy to overlook inserting a
valuation in those bills of lading which require it. The Commission
noticed this in its report in Dry Goods Dependent on Value, but suggested no remedy. The following short extract is from that report:
"In April 1948, when [the tariffs provided that] no shipments
[of clothing and of certain kinds of dry goods] were to be accepted
unless their value had been declared, Davidson transported 161
shipments of clothing between points in Middle Atlantic territory.
Eighty-two shipments were accepted without declared or released
value, in violation of the tariff provisions, 47 were released to the
minimum value, and on 32 the additional charge for excess valuation was paid."36
The experience of other truc~ng companies, as shown by the report,
was much the same. Under the law it is the duty of the carrier to see
that proper bills of lading are made out, but the general practice is for
the shipper to make them out and hand the carrier's copies to the driver
ss 53 M.C.C. 157 at 162 (1951).
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of the truck. The driver of course knows nothing about the intricacies
of released rates, and by the time the bills of lading are seen by an employee of the carrier who understands the subject the goods are well
on their way to destination-with the carrier responsible for the full
value, however great, and often with a controversial question to be
resolved respecting the proper rate to apply.
The railroads, who in recent years have enlarged somewhat the
list of articles on which they maintain released rates, appear to be
encountering the same problem. They announced recently that they
were considering the publication in their freight classification of certain
rather involved rules designed to fix their liability, as well as the rate
to be assessed, in instances where the rate is based upon released value
but the goods are inadvertently accepted without any declaration of
value having been obtained from the shipper. Without analyzing the
proposed rules here it may be said that on their face they are open to
some doubt as to their legality.
If released-value rates were established for all freight without distinction the problem of obtaining a written declaration from the shipper
would be obviated. The standard bill-of-lading form would then presumably include a stipulation that the carrier's liability was limited
to a specified amount per pound unless the shipper declared a higher
value in writing and paid a rate increment proportioned to the added
risk. The express companies• have used such a bill-of-lading form for
a long time, and the courts have consistently held since the enactment
of the Cummins amendment that the shipper's acceptance of the bill of
lading, even though he fails to sign it, meets the statutory requirement
that the value must be "declared in writing by the shipper or agreed
upon in writing as the released value."37
A reasonable maximum value above which excess-value charges
would attach, would perhaps be 25 cents per pound of gross shipping
weight, with each separate shipping package or piece treated as a unit
for the purpose of determining liability in the event of loss or damage.
It seems a reasonable conjecture, in the absence of any worth-while data,
that fully 95 per cent of the freight carried by the railroads and 75
per cent of that transported by common-carrier trucks is worth less than
25 cents per pound, even in the present era of high prices. Whatever
3 7 A criticism which can validly be made of the express bill of lading is that the valuation provisions are hidden away in rather fine print. They ought to appear at the top of
the document, in bold-face type, so as to bring this very important feature of the contract
home to the shipper.
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the percentages may be, it is fairly certain that if rail and highway
carriers restricted their liability to 25 cents per pound except where the
shipper declared and paid for a greater valuation, the bulk of the freight
traffic of both types of carriers would move at the basic rates, free from
valuation charges, and with the carrier liable for the full value of the
goods if lost.
Moreover, unless the value of the goods was much in excess of the
basic valuation-whether 25 cents per pound or any other figure-the
addition of reasonable excess-valuation charges would result in only a
small increment in the rate. Logically the excess-valuation charges
should be made with close reference to the cost of insurance.38 Possibly a fair charge would be 10 cents for each $100 of excess value,
or one-tenth of one per cent, although insurance can usually be bought
for somewhat less than that figure.
On the bases suggested, therefore, assuming a 20,000-pound truckload of goods worth $10,000 and moving under a rate of $1 per 100
pounds, the freight charges would be $200 if the shipper assumed the
risk of loss above $5,000 (25 cents per pound); but if he elected to
leave the entire risk with the carrier his freight charges would be $205,
or two and one-haH'per cent more (one-tenth of one per cent of $5,000).
Similarly, the cargo being worth $50,000, insurance for that amount
could be obtained for $50, representing a twenty-five per cent increase
in the total charges.
One objection which doubtless would be made to placing all rates
on a released-value basis is that it would go counter to the time-worn
rule that freight rates should be determined largely by "the value of the
service." That expression, a euphemism for "charging what the traffic
will bear," means that rates for the transportation of expensive goods
may properly exceed those for the transportation of cheap goods by
considerably more than the difference in the cost incurred by the carrier
in performing the service.39
38 Although the Commission's decision in the Stone case appears to have obscured
thinking on the subject of released rates in recent years, the following statement from that
decision is as valid now as it ever was: " •.• it is clear that if the excess of the unreleased
over the released rates [i.e., the excess-valuation charge] is more than the cost of insurance,
shippers will ordinarily release the carrier and obtain transit insurance elsewhere. But
frequently transit insurance can not be obtained. When it is not available, those shippers who
are financially able to do so will assume the risk of loss themselves. The small shipper is
less apt to be able to risk the loss of his less frequent shipments, and will thus in greater
measure feel compelled to resort to the higher unreleased rates for adequate protection. The
alternative rates which would result from the carriers' proposals will thus not work with
equal justice to all." 93 I.C.C. 91 at 94 (1924).
39 Thus, in Classification of Canned Goods, 98 I.C.C. 166 (1925), the Commission
said (at 172-173): "If in the establishment of rates or classifications differences in value of
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In that connection it may be observed, first, that when a common
rate is accorded to all articles in a related group, notwithstanding wide
variations in the value of individual articles, as is inevitably done in
fixing rates for a great many groups today, the freight charges manifestly are not based on "the value of the service." On the contrary, as
has been pointed out, the lower-grade articles in the group are being
required to pay part of the cost of transporting the higher-grade articles.
Where, however, rates are published for a single article, or
for a group of articles of fairly uniform value, it would still be
possible even with released rates applicable on all freight, to recognize differences in value in fixing the basic rates. Higher rates
could be charged, for example, on copper than on iron, on wool than on
cotton, and so for hundreds or even thousands of other commodities.
The difference in intrinsic value would remain, regardless of the carrier's liability for loss or damage; and that difference would still justify
a difference in rates, although not so wide a one as was once considered
proper.
As a matter of fact, during the past quarter century since the trucks
came into the transportation field as important competitors of the railroads "the value of the service" has been minimized as a factor in ratemaking to a much greater extent than seems to be generally realized.
In the twenties and thirties the railroads were forced to make deep cuts
in their rates for the transportation of nearly all high-grade traffic, to
avoid losing it to the trucks, and although all rates have since been
substantially increased, the spread in rates between high-grade and lowgrade traffic is now much narrower than formerly. And the spread is
still narrowing, due always to the pressure of truck-rail competition. In
short, rate-makers have been forced to recognize the hard fact that the
"value of the service"-of any service-can never be greater than the
price for which an acceptable substitute is obtainable.
Again, while the propriety of charging high rates on high-grade
traffic in order to permit the maintenance of low rates on low-grade
traffic was hardly open to question so long as the railroads had a monopoly of transportation, it is not possible to import that principle into
the rate structure of the highway carriers for the simple reason that
with relatively few exceptions the traffic carried by any one trucking
the respective commodities carried were reflected in rate increments only sufficient to cover
the cost of insurance, one of two results would of necessity follow. The rates as a whole
would be such that it would be impossible for the carriers to earn what they reasonably
might, and in fact what they necessarily should in order to perform their services; or the
rates on many low-grade commodities would have to be such that they would be prohibitory
of any movement. Union Tanning Co. v. Southern R. Co., 26 I.C.C. 159 (1913)."
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company is not sufficiently diversified to permit the principle to operate. The trucking company which is carrying dry goods, cigarettes
and whiskey is not carrying any appreciable volume of fertilizer and
crushed stone, and vice versa. Each carrier necessarily must charge
rates high enough to cover the costs of transporting the particular traffic
which it is carrying. At the same time, no highway carrier, no matter
what class of goods makes up the preponderance of its traffic, can charge
much more than the cost of performing the service, for if it does it is
certain sooner or later to lose the business to contract or to private trucks.
The problem of extraordinary value and extraordinary liability in
transporting freight concerns both rail and highway carriers. In the
case of the highway carriers, at least, it is one which calls imperatively
for solution. Yet those carriers could take no effective action looking
toward a change in their bill-of-lading form and placing all of their
rates on a released-value basis except through an industry-wide application to the Commission; and concerted action by so many different
carriers is virtually impossible to obtain. As a matter of fact joint action
by the highway carriers alone, assuming it could be obtained, would
not suffice. The standard bill-of-lading form which the Commission
approved in 1948 is intended for use, and is widely used, for both
rail and truck shipments. The convenience of using a single document for either mode of transportation is one which the shipping public
would not willingly relinquish. Hence an application to the Commission for permission to place all freight rates on a released-value basis
and to make the necessary changes in the bill-of-lading form should
properly emanate from both groups of carriers. But if neither group
alone can act, obviously both cannot act together.
Unfortunately, therefore, there is no foreseeable prospect that the
problem will be dealt with authoritatively until and unless the Commission takes the initiative and issues the requisite permissions and
orders to the rail and highway carriers pursuant to an ex parte proceeding.

